Commentary: Automated Argument Analysis – Comment on: Mizrahi & Dickinson:  Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study by Lumer, Christoph
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 12: Evidence, Persuasion & Diversity 
Jun 6th, 8:01 AM - 9:00 AM 
Commentary: Automated Argument Analysis – Comment on: 
Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An 
Empirical Study" 
Christoph Lumer 
University of Siena 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Lumer, Christoph, "Commentary: Automated Argument Analysis – Comment on: Mizrahi & Dickinson: 
"Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study"" (2020). OSSA Conference Archive. 4. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA12/Saturday/4 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Automated Argument Analysis – Comment on: Mizrahi & Dickinson: 
"Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study" 
 
 
Christoph Lumer 
University of Siena, Italy 
 
Università di Siena 
DISPOC (Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive) 
Via Roma, 56 
I-53100 Siena 
Italy 
E-Mail: lumer@unisi.it 
Homepage: http://www.lumer.info/ 
 
Contribution to the 12th OSSA Conference, 2020. 
1. Mizrahi & Dickinson's analysis of philosophical argument types 
In their empirical study "Argumentation in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study" (M&D 
2020), Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson examined the change in philosophical types of 
argument over the last 150 years (1867-2017). They searched an extensive corpus of texts from 
JSTORE with 435,703 (M&D 1; 6; 12) philosophical publications for argument indicators for three 
types of arguments, namely deductive, "inductive" and abductive ("i.e. arguments in which the 
conclusion is supposed to be the best explanation for some phenomenon" (Govier 2010: 298-302, 
quoted in M&D 3)). More precisely, they used 36 argument indicator pairs for each of these three 
types of arguments, with one component indicating an inferential relationship - e.g. "therefore", 
"hence" (nine in total) - and the other indicating the type of argument - e.g. "necessarily", 
"probably", "best explain" (four per argumentation type) -, so that indicator pairs such as "therefore 
necessarily", "therefore certainly", "hence necessarily", "so definitely" were used to find deductive 
arguments, indicator pairs such as "therefore probably", "consequently likely" were used to detect 
inductive arguments, and indicator pairs such as "therefore best explain" and "hence make sense of" 
were used to determine abductive arguments (M&D 3-5). (There could be up to ten other words 
between the two components. (M&D 6)) 
Mizrahi & Dickinson summarize their results with the following hypotheses: 
H1: "Deductive arguments were the most common type of argument in philosophy until the end of 
the twentieth century: [H1.1.] significantly more common than abductive, [1.2] but not inductive, 
arguments." (M&D 1; 2; similar 8; 10; 11) 
H2: "Then, around 2008 a shift in methodology occurred, and inductive arguments took over as the 
most common type of argument." (M&D 1; 2-3; similar 11) 
H3: "In addition, abductive arguments are becoming increasingly more popular in philosophy." 
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(M&D 1; 3; similar 11) 
H2r.&3r: "Our results suggest that deductive arguments are giving way to not only inductive 
arguments but also abductive arguments in philosophical practice." (M&D 1; 3; similar 12) 
In addition to the results of the statistical analysis, they also provide graphs (three of them, 
for up to three words, up to six and up to ten words distance between the two indicator components) 
with the proportions of texts that, according to the indicators, contained at least one deductive, one 
inductive, and one abductive argument, respectively, in the total number of philosophical 
publications of one of the 150 years. These graphs show the increase of all three types of argument 
over time - since about 1950, the increase in a smoothed curve would probably be almost linear for 
all three types of argument - and they also show that the deductive arguments have been overtaken 
by the inductive ones as claimed in H2. (M&D 7; 9; 10) 1 
2. A positive assessment and the course of the further discussion 
The effort of the study, the number of texts examined and the degree of statistical elaboration are 
impressive. The amount of work must have been enormous. And I acknowledge the pioneering 
work. I also appreciate the great clarity in the presentation of the method used. 
I would like to place before everything else my overall assessment of the hypotheses put 
forward by Mizrahi & Dickinson. I consider the following of their hypotheses to be plausible: 
H1 (deductive arguments are dominant until 2000),  
H1.1 (deductive arguments are significantly more frequent than abductive ones),  
H3 (since about 2008 there are significantly more abductive arguments),  
H2r&3r (the relation of inductive and abductive to deductive arguments improves in favor of 
inductive and abductive) 
These hypotheses also coincide with my experiences with the increase in experimental philosophy 
since about 2008, the strengthening of methodological naturalism and also the discussion of the 
corresponding studies by authors who do not share these approaches. 
The following hypotheses of Mizrahi and Dickinson, on the other hand, are not sufficiently 
supported by the study: 
H1.2 (until 2000 deductive arguments were not significantly more frequent than inductive ones), 
H2 (from 2000 on, inductive arguments are more frequent than deductive ones). 
The methods used by Mizrahi and Dickinson to prove these theses are, as I will show in a moment, 
so uncertain, so weak indicators for the actual numerical relationships, that the - even according to 
their results - small lead of inductive versus deductive (according to the 10-word distance 
measurement) in the peak year 2009 of about 31.8% inductive to 30.3% deductive (read from M&D 
 
1  With this reading of the curves, however, I am not completely sure. The authors describe the relations only as 
e.g. "Ratios of philosophy publications in the JSTORE corpus with deductive, inductive, and abductive 
arguments" (M&D 7; 9; 10), without specifying what the denominator of this fraction is. However, the most 
plausible interpretation is: the total number of philosophical publications in a given year contained in the 
JSTORE database. And I don't really see any other reasonable interpretation. 
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10, Figure 3) is by no means sufficient to prove the predominance of inductive arguments over 
deductive ones since 2008 or even the merely insignificant lead of deductive arguments over 
inductive ones until 2008. The validity of the method of analysis used is, as I will show soon, so 
imprecise that the numerical result of Mizrahi & Dickinson is, instead of the numerical ratio of 
inductive to deductive of 1/0.953 (=1/(30.3%/31.8%)) in the year 2009 in favor of inductive in my 
estimation, compatible with an actual numerical ratio of 1/0.2 or conversely of 1/5. 
In the next section I would like to substantiate this assessment of the merely very imprecise 
indicator function of the method used by Mizrahi &Dickinson by a more detailed analysis. 
Secondly, I will address some further weaknesses of the method used. However, I would like to 
repeat here once again my recognition of the pioneering work. In this respect, the following 
criticism is to be understood as a constructive indication for future studies. - Section 4 draws a 
more general theoretical conclusion from this methodological critique on the possibilities of 
computerized, automatic argument analysis, especially the classification of argument types. - 
Finally, Section 5 discusses the philosophical significance of Mizrahi & Dickinson's analysis and 
similar empirical studies in general: What does an empirical philosophy of this kind offer? 
3. A critical analysis of the method used by Mizrahi & Dickinson 
In the following I discuss some aspects of the method used by Mizrahi & Dickinson. 
Text selection, the basic set of analyzed texts:  
1. Language: The authors summarize their results as follows: "Overall, the results of our empirical 
study suggest that deductive arguments were the most common type of argument in philosophy 
until the end of the twentieth century ...". (M&D 2) And on representativeness they write: "Since 
our results were obtained from a survey of a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the 
JSTOR database (n = 435,703), we can be quite confident that they are representative of 
philosophical practice." (M&D 12). Now, as indicators for the different types of arguments, only 
English expressions were used, such as "therefore necessarily", "consequently improbable". Does 
this mean that arguments in non-English languages are not philosophical arguments per se? (The 
fact that the non-English languages are underrepresented in JSTORE is problematic enough. That 
they are completely ignored here, however, is dramatic.) This - presumably unintentional and 
simply naive - Anglo-Saxon chauvinism may also lead to serious distortions of the quantitative 
results, if - and there is some evidence for this - the "inductive wave" (see below) in non-English 
philosophical publications, for example, is by far not as large as in English-speaking ones. 
2. Criterion for a philosophical text: By what criteria was it determined what a philosophical text 
is? Unfortunately, the authors do not say. Is the criterion that it was published in a journal to be 
considered philosophical? What then applies to journals such as 'American Journal of Theology and 
Philosophy', 'Philosophy and Rhetoric'? The articles published there are certainly not all 
philosophical. And do not, conversely, philosophical articles also appear in the general journals of 
the surrounding disciplines or interdisciplinary journals such as 'Philosophy and Economics' or 
'Philosophical Psychology'? What applies to monographs and anthologies? The texts cover a period 
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of 150 years, the oldest of which date from 1867. Can we be sure that the texts in "philosophical" 
journals were always philosophical? In the past, philosophical texts also included texts that we 
would now quite clearly regard as educational or psychological. Different criteria for the 
philosophical character of a text naturally change the results considerably. Presumably, the more 
liberal the admission, the greater the proportion of "inductive" arguments. 
Different types of arguments: The authors distinguish between deductive, inductive and 
abductive arguments. What deductive arguments are is probably fairly clear in the argumentation 
theory community. The other two categories are more problematic. 
Inductive arguments: What "inductive arguments" are supposed to be is not defined by the authors. 
But it is clear from the context that for them inductive arguments are those arguments in which 
probabilistic words such as "probably", "likely", "improbable", "plausible" occur in the thesis or in 
the description of the inferential relationship (M&D 3). This criterion is rather un-theoretical and 
leads to a completely heterogeneous set of arguments. 1. Apart from probabilistic arguments, many 
of the actual probabilistic indicators also occur in all non-probabilistic arguments, especially to 
express uncertainty, in particular in practical arguments, but even in deductive ones: "Probably the 
thesis follows from it", if the final relationship is complicated and has not been formally verified. 
One can also express a thesis probabilistically out of laziness, if one does not take the trouble to 
give a more rigorous proof. 2. The set of really probabilistic arguments that want to establish 
degrees of probability is very heterogeneous. This might have been worth the differentiation. For 
example, epistemologically reconstructed, even the genesis of knowledge arguments such as 
arguments from expert opinion, arguments from position to know, source references, which are 
usually understood as a separate group, belong to the probabilistic arguments. (Lumer 2011a) 3. 
From probabilism does not follow that these are empirical arguments in the usual sense - as the 
authors seem to assume, however - namely that from individual observations a general connection 
is inferred or from there back to an individual case. Example: "We have not seen a real proof of p. 
Therefore, probably we cannot say that p."  
Abductive arguments: 1. Arguments that provide the best explanation can be very different in 
structure, ranging from simple backward conclusions: "Where smoke rises, there is probably a fire. 
There is smoke rising. Underneath is probably a fire" to fully developed interpretive arguments 
with alternative hypothetical explanations of known facts and the Bayesian determination of the 
probability of these explanations; in the latter case the "best explanation" is interpreted as the most 
probable. The former are indicative argumentations with simple statistical (inferences) with a 
special content. The latter are interpretive arguments with a very high complexity. (Cf. Lumer 
1990: 221-246) This structural difference is neglected by Mizrahi & Dickinson's classification. But 
perhaps this is not so serious, and this differentiation can also be omitted. 2. But in any case, 
arguments to the best explanation, correctly analysed, also belong to the probabilistic arguments, 
i.e. according to the terminology of Mizrahi and Dickinson to the inductive arguments. 
Accordingly, all their indicators of "inductive" argumentations can also indicate abductive 
arguments. However, if abductive arguments are treated as a separate type of argument, then other 
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prominent subtypes of probabilistic arguments would also have to be treated as separate types of 
argument. 
Elementary and molecular arguments: 1. Molecular or complex arguments are composed of several 
elementary arguments to form a tree structure, whereby the arguments at the ends of the tree 
establish the premises for the arguments further towards the trunk. Such complex arguments often 
involve elementary arguments of different types; and yet molecular argumentation can often be 
assigned to a particular type of argument (see Lumer 2011a). According to the method of Mizrahi 
and Dickinson, all elements of a molecular argumentation would be included as separate 
arguments. However, this contradicts the usual approach, according to which complex arguments 
are regarded as one argument. 2. The method of Mizrahi & Dickinson can then also lead to a 
distortion of the numerical relations between the types of arguments, for example if one type of 
argument is used more often than others in a subordinate function. This is somewhat the case with 
practical arguments that often use probabilistic arguments to prove their consequential assumptions.  
Missing argument types: The triple list of deductive, inductive, abductive arguments does 
not contain a number of other arguments, which are, however, philosophically relevant: 
- practical arguments (for value judgements with the listing of advantages and disadvantages of the 
value object); 
- genuine statistical arguments (with information on correlations and levels of significance; these 
arguments usually do not speak of "probability"); 
- intuitionistic arguments (which use certain intuitions as the essential premise); 
- genesis of knowledge arguments (which refer to the verification of the thesis by another person: 
argument from from expert opinion, reference to historical sources, arguments from testimony). 
While practical arguments are definitely a separate type of argument alongside deductive and 
probabilistic ones, descriptive statistical and intuitionistic arguments are mostly deductive and 
genesis of knowledge arguments are probabilistic (Lumer 2011a). But this is highly controversial. 
And it should have been addressed. 
Empirical determination of the argument types - errors in the recognition of argument 
types: In the empirical identification of argument types within the selected text corpus, basically 
two types of errors can occur: 1. false positive, misclassifications, in which a piece of text is 
classified as argument of type T although the piece of text is not an argument of type T, and 2. false 
negatives, it is not recognized that an argument of type T is present. A special case are false 
positives, which are also false negatives, i.e. if an argument is classified as being of a different type 
than it is. 
False positives: 1. Some of the argument indicators used by Mizrahi & Dickinson may, despite 
their first appearance, indicate something different than the assumed type of argumentation: e.g. 
"accordingly ..." may indicate the execution of a plan or the compliance with criteria: "Accordingly, 
I definitely took her at her word"; "Accordingly necessarily we first had to check whether...". 2. 
The indicators may be taken from a literal quotation or a paraphrased text, from which the argumer 
however disassociates himself: "The author infers that certainly p. But ...". 3. The indicator may be 
qualified or even negated by the context: "From this we cannot infer that necessarily p holds"; "it 
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seems therefore necessarily that p; however ...".  
False negatives: 1. Most arguments use only one indicator and not two. The inference indicator can 
be missing and only the strength indicator can be used: "p1, ..., pn. Necessarily t." The converse 
case is much more frequent, however, namely that the inference indicator is present, but the 
strength indicator or abduction indicator is omitted. 2. Instead of the mentioned indicators, wording 
variants of them are used: "infer / proves with necessity" (instead of "infer / proves necessarily"); 
"we have proved definitely" (instead of "proves definitely"). 3. Completely different indicators are 
used than those that appear in the Mizrahi & Dickinson list, including also those that the authors 
themselves have mentioned before, especially inferential indicators: "because of p q (holds)"; 
"because p we can be sure that q", "this makes me think", "with this I have shown that", "this makes 
it probable", "this implies", "since (then)", "then also holds", "presumably then", "this is strong / 
weak evidence for", "the most probable explanation for this is". 4. Not the usual inference 
indicators are used, but completely free descriptions like: "my thesis is ...; and the reasons for it 
are", "why should it be the case that? Well, consider". 5. No explicit argument indicators are used at 
all, which in English, unlike in other European languages, occurs relatively frequently, but the 
argumentative connection results only from the content. 6. The distance between inference 
indicator and qualifier is even greater than 10 words. 
Much more false negatives than false positives: Mizrahi & Dickinson have chosen extra strong 
indicators to exclude false positives ("In order to make sure that our indicators for argument types 
[...] aktucally indicate arguments in the corpus, we anchored them to argument indicators, such as 
'therefore' and 'hence'." (M&D 4)). And indeed, the resulting combinations are already relatively 
safe signs for the respective assumed arguments - even if, as analyzed above, false positives 
remain. The price for this relatively high degree of certainty in the exclusion of false positives by 
an indicator overkill is, conversely, the high number of false negatives: If the hurdles for 
"recognition" as an argument of a certain type are set so high, then they are not met by very many 
arguments that definitely belong to this type. Many arguments do not use this double indicator, but 
only a single one (and, in addition, others than specified or none at all, see below). I estimate that 
with the argument indicators used by Mizrahi & Dickinson at most 10% of the actual arguments of 
the type in question are covered. ([Note:] This, my estimate may seem prima facie to be completely 
wrong if one considers e.g. that 2009, the year with the most hits, the "inductive" arguments are 
31.8%, so that there would be room for a tripling (95.4%) but not for a tenfold increase. But this 
appearance is deceptive: the number of hits does not indicate the proportion of argumentations, but 
the proportion of texts with this type of argumentation, whether this text contains one or 100 
arguments of this type.) 
Due to the high proportion of false negatives very large uncertainty, strong distortions of the 
relations are possible: Mizrahi & Dickinson may have chosen the strong indicators with the hidden 
idea that the numerical relations among the captured arguments of the three types are the same as 
among all arguments of these types in their text corpus. But with the high number of false 
negatives, a relatively small difference in the rates of false negatives for the three argument types 
makes a great deal of difference to the overall ratio. For example, if the proportion of false 
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negatives in the deductive arguments is 90%, but 95% in the "inductive" arguments, then the 
measured ratio can change from 1:1 to 1:2. 
No check of the reliability of the test instrument: What is most surprising in this situation is that the 
authors did not check the reliability of their test instrument (i.e. the automated search by computer 
for the given argument indicators) at all and did not calibrate this instrument. Such a reliability 
check can be carried out relatively easily by having the test instrument examine some texts, from 
which all the arguments contained in them have been identified and classified by reading and 
analysis, and comparing the two results. - I started such a test with an analysis of Derek Parfits 
article: "Equality and Priority" (1997). The result confirms the criticism that has been made so far 
from a theoretical standpoint: The search for the 108 indicators of Mizrahi & Dickinson had exactly 
one result: on page 208 the indicator words "necessarily ... therefore" were found with a sufficiently 
small distance. Unfortunately, this was a false positive: Parfit only explains the application of the 
telic egalitarian criterion here; it is therefore, if at all, something like a quoted argument, not one of 
Parfit's himself. - Parfit's text is not particularly argumentative but explanatory: Parfit describes a 
new, prioritarian criterion for distributive justice and differentiates it from egalitarian ones. 
Nevertheless, the text contains a whole range of arguments which cannot be found with the method 
of Mizrahi & Dickinson, i.e. false negatives: 2 practical arguments (Parfit 1997: 210-211) (in them 
objections are introduced with the words "objections" ... In addition, the text contains a whole range 
of deductive arguments, e.g. on page 212 with the argumentation indicator "since" or on pages 215-
216 with the argumentation indicator "then".No check of the reliability of the test instrument: What 
is most surprising in this situation is that the authors did not check the reliability of their test 
instrument (i.e. the automated search by computer for the given argument indicators) at all and did 
not calibrate this instrument. Such a reliability check can be carried out relatively easily by having 
the test instrument examine some texts, from which all the arguments contained in them have been 
identified and classified by reading and analysis, and comparing the two results. - I started such a 
test with an analysis of Derek Parfits article: "Equality and Priority" (1997). The result confirms the 
criticism that has been made so far from a theoretical standpoint: The search for the 108 indicators 
of Mizrahi & Dickinson had exactly one result: on page 208 the indicator words "necessarily ... 
therefore" were found with a sufficiently small distance. Unfortunately, this was a false positive: 
Parfit only explains the application of the telic egalitarian criterion here; it is therefore, if at all, 
something like a quoted argument, not one of Parfit's himself. - Parfit's text is not particularly 
argumentative but explanatory: Parfit describes a new, prioritarian criterion for distributive justice 
and differentiates it from egalitarian ones. Nevertheless, the text contains a whole range of 
arguments which cannot be found with the method of Mizrahi & Dickinson, i.e. false negatives: 2 
practical arguments (Parfit 1997: 210-211) (in them objections are introduced with the words 
"objections" ... In addition, the text contains a whole range of deductive arguments, e.g. on page 
212 with the argumentation indicator "since" or on pages 215-216 with the argumentation indicator 
"then". 
The empirical determination of argumentation types - methodological distortion of 
quantities: What the authors count with their method is not the number of deductive, inductive and 
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abductive arguments in the philosophical publications of one year each, but with regard to the 
publications of one year: the sums of all numbers of the types of deductive, inductive or abductive 
argument indicators occurring in the individual publications (M&D 6) 2 Thus, behind one unit of 
the count there can be one argument with a certain indicator, but also 20 or more. In order to 
determine the weight of e.g. deductive arguments, however, the number of arguments should 
actually be considered. Of course both quantities might correlate optimally, but this would be 
coincidence. Distortions also of the relations of the frequencies of the individual argument types 
can result from the following: 1. Authors use a very limited number of indicators for a certain 
argument type, while they vary the indicator very much for another argument type. 2. Behind the 
individual indicator types there are very different numbers of indicator occurrences and thus of 
arguments. (This leads in particular to distortions if these different frequencies are not compensated 
by an increase in the richness of variation of the indicator expressions. For example, the author uses 
three indicator types each for deductive arguments and for "inductive" arguments; but in the text 
there are 20 deductive and five "inductive" argumentations). 
A methodological blemish is that the article does not contain certain information that would 
have been helpful for the classification of the result: How many texts contained arguments  at all 
and how many arguments of what kind? Which indicators of argumentation occurred how often? 
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